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Abstract
When a single gift goes to a group of recipients, how does giving depend on the
size of the group? This question is important for understanding charitable giving and
fund-raising, public goods provision, family altruism, and more. If we think of the gift
as giving up a dollar to create a social surplus, then we want to know how the number of
recipients of that surplus a⁄ects its value to the giver. In other words, how congestible
is altruism? This paper builds a theoretical framework for this question and begins to
answer it with a controlled experiment. The ￿nding is that for most subjects altruism
is congestible. For the average subject, a gift that results in one person receiving x is
equivalent to one in which npeople receive x=n0:68 each.
￿I am extremely grateful to Joseph Guse for his outstanding research assistance, and to Bill Harbaugh,
Martin Sefton, and Megan Ritz for helpful comments. I also acknowledge ￿nancial support from the National
Science Foundation and the Russell Sage Foundation.1 Introduction
How much would you give up if each dollar you forfeited bene￿ted another person by $10?
What if instead your dollar gave $5 each to two others, or $2 each to ￿ve others, or $1 each
to ten others? In each case the private costs and social bene￿ts are the same, but would
we view these as the same situation? Similarly, what if each dollar you gave up bene￿ted
one other by $1 each, or bene￿ted 2 others by $1 each, or 3 others, and so on? If the same
private cost generates bene￿ts for more people, do you spend more or less on giving?
These questions are important for understanding gift giving when there are groups of
recipients. Consider two public goods, one at a local level and one at a national level.
Suppose the local good provides high value to a few people, the national good provides low
value to many, and that the total value of these is identical. Which would an altruist
prefer? Another example would be charitable solicitations from both the local chapter and
the national organization of a charity. A particular donation might a⁄ect more people at a
higher level. Would donors give more or less as a result?
Suppose instead the gift is to a food bank. There is a ￿nite amount of food, and more
recipients means each gets less. Do you give more or less as the number of recipients
increases? Another example is a restaurant sta⁄ that pools its tips. A given tip will now
only go partly to your waiter, and partly to the others. Does that make people more or less
generous? Or consider a parent thinking of buying a new television for the family. Will
she spend more, all else equal, if the household has 4 members rather than 3?
These questions are also relevant for experimental research. If a generous act in an
experiment, such as giving to a public good or striking a fair bargain, is shared with more
people at the same cost, do people value it more or less?
Economic theory can give us some guidance in answering these questions. Consider the
￿rst counterfactual above: The same social surplus is divided among more individuals. If
people care only about the total amount received, then increasing the number of others,
n, will have no e⁄ect. If, at the opposite extreme, they care about the average amountreceived, then increasing n increases the e⁄ective price of giving, which means they may
reduce giving.
Consider the second counterfactual: Increasing the group size expands the surplus, but
keeps the average bene￿ts the same. Increasing n here means that any dollar given up
will generate more bene￿ts, indicating people should be more generous as n increases￿ an
income e⁄ect. On the other hand, the same social bene￿t can be attained at lower cost.
This means people may give less away￿ a substitution e⁄ect. Which e⁄ect dominates will
depend on preferences of individuals.
A unifying approach to this is to frame the issue in terms of congestion, as in the literature
on congestible public goods. The congestion here, however, is in the hearts of the altruists,
rather than in the technology of the public good. Think ￿rst of the total social surplus
generated for others by the dollars forfeited. Call this total surplus ￿o. Then let ￿o = ￿o=n
be the average surplus for others. If the individual giver views the gift, g, as being the total
social surplus, independent of n, then this is a good that is not congested at all and g0 =
￿o = n￿o. On the other extreme, if the giver thinks of the gift as the average social surplus,
then the good is completely congested, g1 = ￿o=n = ￿o. As with congestible public goods,




with b 2 [0;1]: This paper will be about identifying b.
There have been no ￿eld studies and only a few experimental studies of altruism and
the e⁄ects of group size. Comparing groups of size two and four in public goods provision,
Goeree, Holt and Laury (2002) found no clear e⁄ect. Isaac and Walker (1988) and Isaac,
Walker and Williams (1994) compared public goods games with groups of size 4, 10, 40 and
100, with varying marginal returns to giving. They found no e⁄ect of group size when the
price was low (0.33), but when the price of giving was high (2.33) groups of 4 were less
generous than groups of 10￿ the income e⁄ect dominates the substitution e⁄ect￿ but the
e⁄ect largely vanished when comparing groups of 40 and 100. The experiments of Kahneman
and Knetsch (1992) ￿nd similar e⁄ects. When subjects were asked their willingness to pay
2for a local public good, followed by asking about a regional or national public good, giving
rose.1
Although the main interest in studying congestion in giving is, obviously, real world
giving, we begin the study of it here with a controlled laboratory experiment. The e⁄ects
we ￿nd could be help shape the ￿eld studies necessary to demonstrate the validity of the
laboratory ￿ndings.
The experiment reported in this paper o⁄ers subjects a series of 24 decisions which vary
the number of recipients and the ￿price￿of generosity. The experiment builds on earlier
work by Andreoni and Miller (2002) who used similar techinques to uncover preferences for
altruism, but who kept the number of recipients ￿xed at one.
We will use three approaches to uncover preferences. First is a nonparametric revealed
preference approach that holds n ￿xed. Next is a semi-parametric approach. This begins
by hypothesizing a parametric ￿giving￿function that enters utility, and then by using non-
parametric analysis of utility to ￿nd the best parameters on the giving functions. That is,
we ￿nd the parameter in the giving function that results in no violations (or the smallest
violations) of revealed preference. Third is a fully parametric approach to the estimation of
utility functions. With each approach we describe and catalogue the variety of preferences
exhibited by our subjects.
The ￿ndings are, ￿rst, that there is a remarkable degree of consistency within subjects,
and surprisingly few violations of the axioms of revealed preference. Second, while there are
many examples of individuals who behave as though b = 0 or b = 1; the majority of subjects
are best described by a b between 0 and 1. Combining the entire sample and estimating
a single representative utility function, we estimate the best aggregate b to be b = 0:68:
This means that, whether looking at the problem non-parametrically, semi-parametrically
or fully parametrically, or whether it is individual or aggregate analysis, we must conclude
1Others study group size and giving to discrete or step level public goods. These are quite di⁄erent
from what is in mind here, as these experiments usually require a minimum total contribution or number
of contributors in order to move the provision of a public good from zero to a single positive value. See
Bagnoli McKee (1991), Croson and Marks (1998), for instance.
3that altruism is a congestible good, but the congestion is partial￿ doubling the number of
recipients increases but does not double the value of altruism to the giver.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section will present the formal framework of
congestible altruism. Section 3 will present the experimental design. We present the general
results in section 4, followed by nonparametric and semi-parametric analysis of the data using
revealed preference techniques in section 5. Sections 6 and 7 turn to parametric analysis,
presenting estimates of utility for each individual subject as well as for a representative
altruist. Section 8 concludes.
2 Model
Let ￿i be the marginal payo⁄ to individual i and let ￿o be the additional payo⁄ to each of
the others as a consequence of i￿ s choice. Again, let n be the number of others a⁄ected.
Then the maintained hypothesis is that individuals have utility ui = ui(￿i;￿o;n); where
preferences are convex in ￿i and ￿o; and (weakly) increasing in n: It is also natural to
expect that u is increasing in both ￿i and ￿o; as found by Andreoni and Miller (2002).2
Suppose utility is separable on (￿o;n): Then there is some function g(￿o;n) such that
utility can be written as ui(￿i;￿o;n) = ui(￿i;g(￿o;n)): We can think of g abstractly as
an individual￿ s ￿giving￿function, that is, the particular aggregation of ￿o that this person
cares about.3 The question for research is to identify these aggregations, g(￿o;n); as well
as learn how utility changes as the value of this aggregation changes.4 Thinking ￿rst about
2See also Fisman, Kariv and Markowits (2006). With downward sloping budgets it is impossible to
identify preferences where ￿o may be a ￿bad￿ at the margin. However, o⁄ering some upward sloping
budgets, Andreoni and Miller (2002) found that there was a signi￿cant minority of subjects for whom
indi⁄erence curve may actually ￿bend back￿for some extreme inequality. Andreoni, Castillo and Petrie
(2003) con￿rm this for strategic games as well. Since we are concerned with voluntary altruism here, we
do not concern ourselves with such ￿jealous￿or ￿resentful￿preferences, but this is an interesting area for
future research.
3The main restriction imposed by the assumption of separability is that how people aggregate giving is
independent of their own level of consumption, that is, the marginal rate of substitution between ￿o and n
is independent of x. In our experiments, a subject￿ s income varies only slightly, so this is unlikely to be a
costly assumption. Whether it is a valid assumption for ￿eld data is an interesting question.
4Note that we are generalizing the model of ￿warm-glow giving￿ (Andreoni, 1989, 1990) to mean that
utility of giving depends on the number of recipients. With n constant (or as we see later, n large) the
4g(￿o;n), at one extreme we could have g(￿o;n) = ￿o; that is, people care only about the
average received. At the other extreme we could have g(￿o;n) = n￿o; so people care about
the total amount received. What about something intermediate? In the literature on
congestion in public goods, there is a history of estimating ￿crowding￿with a parameter, b,
and a function, g(￿o;n) = nb￿o: Thus for b = 0 or b = 1 we have the extreme cases, while
for b 2 [0;1] we allow intermediate cases.5
Consider a person facing a linear budget over payo⁄s. For simplicity we will always treat





s.t. ￿i + p￿o = m
It is convenient to think of the person as choosing g = g(￿o;n) rather than ￿o: Thus,






Let p0 = p=nb. Solving (1) we get a demand function g(p0;m): As usual, assume @g=@p0 < 0.













We can now see the income and substitution e⁄ects of n on giving, ￿o: As n increases,
the price of g falls but the total amount of bene￿t rises, and the e⁄ect on total spending is
ambiguous.
distinction is irrelevant. The analysis could be generalized to a strategic environment where altruism also
depends on the contributions of others, but the fundamental insights of this model would be una⁄ected.
5Suppose, for instance, that g(￿o;n) combines the two extreme notions in a Cobb-Douglas production
function for giving, so g(￿o;n) = (n￿o)b￿1￿b
o = nb￿o: On the genesis of the literature on congestible public
goods, see Bergstrom and Goodman (1973), for instance. For a general treatment of public goods and group
size, see Bergstrom, Blume and Varian (1986) and Andreoni (1988a).
5With this as our setup, we use the axioms of revealed preference to identify whether, for
a given b, preferences are consistent with maximizing behavior. We do this by applying the
Generalize Axiom, GARP. We say a bundle (￿ia;ga) is directly revealed preferred to a bundle
(￿ib;gb) if ￿ia + p0
aga ￿ ￿ib + p0
agb. The relation is strict if the inequality is strict. We then
say a bundle (￿ia;ga) is revealed preferred to a bundle (￿ib;gb) if there is a chain of directly
revealed preferred relations that links the two. That is, the revealed preferred relation is
the transitive closure of the directly revealed preferred relation. Then de￿ne GARP this
way (Varian 1982):
De￿nition 1 Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preference (GARP): If (￿ia;ga) is revealed
preferred to (￿ib;gb) then (￿ib;gb) is never strictly directly revealed preferred to (￿ia;ga):
As Varian (1982) shows, if the data is consistent with GARP, then there exists a utility
function that could have generated the data. Checking GARP will be at the heart of our
analysis.
2.1 Interpreting the Price
How do we think about price p in this setting? Recall, we constructed ￿o as the value per
recipient. Thus, if giving is to a pure public good, the average value can simply be measured
as the cost to the giver. In this case, absent any subsidies or other distortions, we can assume
p = 1:
What if instead the gift is a pure private good, as in the example of pooling of tips? If ￿o
is the tip received by each of the waitsta⁄, then total spending on tips is n￿o. This means
p = n:
It is possible, as well, that the gift provided is itself a congestible public good. Perhaps
the gift provides for a seminar series in the economics department. If seminars are crowded
the pleasure of the experience is decreased for all. Following the literature on congestion
in public goods, we would say the total surplus is
Q
= nc￿o, where 0 ￿ c ￿ 1: In order
to generate a given ￿o in average value, therefore, a person will need to spend nc￿o dollars.
6Thus, p = nc, meaning that technological congestion has the e⁄ect of raising the price of
altruism.
In the experiments below we enforce giving as a pure public good,but we arti￿cially vary
the price in order to allow us to identify preferences. When applying these results to the real
world, however, we need to be thoughtful about what is determining the price.
3 Experimental Design
The restatement of the problem in (1) indicates that we will need variation in n, m; p and
p=n in order to identify both the utility function and the parameter b. With this in mind,
we designed a task with 24 decisions. The decisions were presented to the subjects on
a computer screen like that shown in Figure 1. Subjects ￿lled in the blanks in sentences
like this: ￿Divide 60 tokens: Hold ___@ 20 cents, and Pass ___ @ 10 cents, to each of
2 other people.￿ The computer automatically made sure that choices were on the budget
constraint. It also calculated the earnings for the subjects in the study, and reported them
in the columns on the right, as seen in Figure 1. It calculated earnings in two ways. First
is average earnings (￿Each of n others earns￿ ) and second is total earnings (￿In Total the n
others earn￿ ), as can be seen in the ￿gure.
The decisions were presented on pages organized by n. Subjects, however, were free to
tab back and forth across pages and could ￿ll in blanks in any order. They could not submit
their decisions until all blanks were ￿lled. To check for possible order e⁄ects we presented
the game in two orders, forward, as shown in the ￿gure, and reverse, where the tabs and the
decisions on each tab were all in reverse order.
For any choice, we can calculate p and m as follows. The task is to divide M tokens
with a hold value of H cents and a pass value of P cents. Let X be the amount held and Y
be the amount passed, adhering to the token constraint X + Y = M: Then ￿i = HX and







Figure 1: Sample Decision Screen
Finally, substituting g(￿o;n) = nb￿o, and de￿ning p = H=P and m = HM, we rewrite this




as in (1) above. Thus, m has the interpretation of the earnings by player i if he passes zero
and keeps M, and p is the cost to person i of increasing the payo⁄ of each other person.
The full set of experimental parameters is shown in Table 1. There are six possible
values for the number of others, n 2 f1;2;3;4;5;9g: Likewise p takes on 10 possible values,
and p=n takes on 12. Care was taken to assure that there would be several sets of budgets
that would be identical on p and m but di⁄er on p=n (budgets 4 and 12, 5 and 9, 10 and
21), and that others would be the same on p=n and m but di⁄er on p (budgets 6 and 12,
and 11 and 22). This will help with identifying b apart from utility parameters. We also
assured that all budgets crossed within a given n:
While subjects made 24 choices, they were only paid for one choice selected at random.6
6Hey and Lee (2005) present evidence to suggest that randomly selecting one of a subject￿ s choices is
8Each choice was equally likely to be chosen. Subjects were told this prior to their decisions.
Table 1
Experimental Parameters and Average Passed
Experimental Parameters￿ Average Passedy
Hold Pass Circular Recip.
Budget n M value value p=n p m tokens tokens
1 1 40 10 40 0.25 0.25 400 14.6 15.9
2 48 10 30 0.33 0.33 480 17.3 18.6
3 60 10 20 0.50 0.50 600 17.1 22.9
4 90 10 10 1 1 900 19.9 24.2
5 60 20 10 2 2 1200 12.1 14.3
6 2 45 20 30 0.33 0.67 900 15.1 18.1
7 81 10 20 0.25 0.50 810 27.7 32.2
8 100 10 10 0.50 1 1000 27.5 32.2
9 60 20 10 1 2 1200 12.8 16.7
10 40 40 10 2 4 1600 7.0 9.3
11 3 40 10 30 0.11 0.33 400 15.8 16.6
12 90 10 10 0.33 1 900 29.9 31.4
13 40 30 20 0.50 1.5 1200 10.9 12.1
14 52 30 10 1 3 1560 10.8 12.6
15 4 80 10 10 4 0.25 800 28.7 28.0
16 72 20 10 2 0.50 1440 22.3 23.5
17 42 10 20 0.5 0.125 420 17.3 17.9
18 50 40 10 4 1 2000 11.4 12.3
19 5 60 10 10 0.20 1 600 20.7 21.3
20 51 20 10 0.40 2 1020 15.5 17.5
21 40 40 10 0.80 4 1600 10.3 11.2
22 9 40 10 10 0.11 1 400 16.6 13.5
23 30 20 10 0.22 2 600 10.6 10.0
24 20 40 10 0.44 4 800 6.3 6.6
￿ M is reported in tokens. Hold value, Pass value and m are reported in cents.
y Average across all subjects, pooled across the two orders.
We were also interested in the possible e⁄ect of reciprocal altruism. For instance, is there
a di⁄erence in giving when it can be reciprocated, as in a public good, and giving when it is
explicitly non-reciprocal? We explored this with two matching conditions. Under reciprocal
matching people are explicitly put into groups and the same decision is carried out for each
successful in getting the subject to treat them as separate independent events, rather than as a portfolio of
random events.
9member of the group. We tell subjects that those who receive their pass amounts are also
in a position to pass to them.7 We weighted the probabilities of choosing di⁄erent groups
so that each decision is equally likely to be chosen. We compare this to circular matching,
which only allows for unilateral altruism.8 After choices were made, the computer program
randomly placed subjects in a ￿circle.￿ For each subject i a choice among the 24 made was
selected at random, and the n people to the right of i were the recipients. Hence, this game
assures subjects that none of the people who receive their generosity will have an option to
give anything back, and this is explained to all the subjects.
We ran 6 sessions of 20 subjects each, for a total of 120 subjects in this study. Three
sessions were run with circular matching and three with reciprocal matching. Within each
matching type, two sessions were run with the forward presentation and one with the reverse
presentation. Each session lasted less than one hour, and subjects earned an average of
$14.23. Complete instructions are available from the author.9
We should note that this design di⁄ers from prior public goods experiments. Earlier
experiments, typi￿ed by Isaac and Walker (1988), usually examine a single group size and a
single price during any session, plus they usually have repeated interactions either with the
same group or with ￿strangers￿rematching (Andreoni, 1988b, 1995). This experiment, by
contrast, asks for a series of decisions without any feedback, and compares choices over a
number of di⁄erent prices and group sizes.
7For the reciprocal matching the instructions read: ￿You will also be randomly selected to be a recipient
of others￿Pass allocations. The recipients of your Pass portion will be those who will be passing to you.
That is, any passed tokens you receive will be from the same other participants who may receive tokens
passed by you. Moreover, these other participants will have the same decision chosen by the computer that
you do. For example, suppose the computer selects this decision for you and 4 others: Divide 80 tokens:
Hold ____ @ 20 cents, and Pass ____ @ 30 cents to each of 4 other people. Then you will be in a group
of 5 people. Each of the 5 has the same decision chosen, and each is potentially passing tokens to the same
other members in that group. ￿
8For the circular matching the instructions read: ￿You will also be randomly selected to be a recipient
of others￿Pass allocations. The recipients of your Pass portion will not be the same participants who will
be passing to you. That is, you will not receive any passed tokens from those other participants who may
receive tokens passed by you.￿
9Go to http://econ.ucsd.edu/~jandreon/ .
104 Overall Results
Table 1 shows the average amount passed on each budget for both the circular and reciprocal
treatments. These results are also shown in Figures 2 and 3. Both ￿gures show the budgets
for (￿i;g): Figure 2 shows the average choice under the assumption of b = 0, while Figure 3
assumes b = 1: As can be seen, both show sensitivity to price and income in the predicted
way.10
Next ask whether there were e⁄ects of either the order of decisions or the matching of
subjects. We conducted Mann-Whitney tests on the distributions of average hold amounts
across subjects. Keeping the matching constant, we found no di⁄erence for order for either
the circular or reciprocal matching, or for the whole sample combined. Combining all 120
subjects, for instance, we ￿nd z = 1:22 (￿ ￿ 0:22):11 This gives us con￿dence that the data
is not biased by the presentation of the decision task. Comparing the matching schemes, we
again employ Mann-Whitney tests and, perhaps surprisingly, we again found no signi￿cant
di⁄erence between matching rules. Comparing all subjects in circular matching to those
reciprocal matching, we ￿nd z = 0:33 (￿ ￿ :74):12 This is evidence that there is no real
e⁄ect of reciprocal versus unilateral altruism. These two ￿ndings indicate that we can safely
pool all 120 subjects into a single sample. We will nonetheless report results separated by
condition, when convenient. As we will see, however, the behavior in all four conditions is
remarkably similar throughout the analysis.
4.1 The Power of the GARP Tests
There are several methods for looking at the power of revealed preference tests.13 The easiest
are the Bronars index (Bronars 1987) and a bootstrapping index (Andreoni and Harbaugh,
10Although aggregate data need not satisfy GARP, there are no violations of revealed preferences for
b = 0;while for the b = 1 aggregation there is one violation involving budgets 17 and 22. These two budgets
are nearly identical when b = 1 and the choices nearly overlap at the intersection.
11For reciprocal matching, z = 0:679 (￿ ￿ 0:49) and for circular matching z = 0:88 (￿ ￿ 0:38):
12This also holds when we look at the forward and reverse orders separately. For forward order, z = 0:48
(￿ ￿ :63) and for reverse order z = 0:13 (￿ ￿ 0:89):
13See Andreoni and Harbaugh (2006) for a complete discussion of the power of revealed preference tests.
11Figure 2: Budgets Assuming g(￿o;n) = ￿o
12Figure 3: Budgets Assuming g(￿o;n) = n￿o
132006). Bronars speci￿es as the alternative hypothesis that choices are drawn randomly from
a uniform distribution on each budget. The bootstrapping index also draws randomly on
each budget, but instead uses the actual distribution of choices made on each budget by the
pooled set of subjects. After creating synthetic subjects, GARP tests are conducted. The
process is then iterated a su¢ cient number of times.
Applying these power tests to our data requires that we also specify a giving function,
g(￿o;n): Choosing g(￿o;n) = nb￿o, we calculated both power indices for 41 values of b
between 0 and 1. In each case, using 10,000 random iterations, over 99.6% of all randomly
generated data had violations of GARP, for both Bronars and bootstrapping indices.14 Given
these methods of randomly generating alternative organizations of the data, these two tests
indicate that we have designed a powerful test of consistent preferences.15
5 Nonparametric Analysis
This section begins by asking whether choices are consistent with GARP. We ￿rst hold
group size constant and check GARP conditional on n. We then combine all the data and
try to uncover the optimal b in g(￿o;n) = nb￿o for each subject.
5.1 Checking GARP Within Group Size
The advantage of checking GARP within a group size is that we need no assumptions on
how preferences depend on n. Table 2 shows the number of violations of GARP conditional
on each n and the matching scheme. Within each n only a small number of subjects had
any violations of GARP. Of those violations, only a fraction were ￿signi￿cant￿as measured
by the Afriat critical cost e¢ ciency index, Ai. This index is a measure of goodness of ￿t.
It indicates how much a budget has to be ￿relaxed￿to avoid violations of GARP. The index
14This is true whether boostrapping was conditional on circular mathing, reciprocal matching, or pooled.
15We also conducted Bronars (1987) power over each subset of budgets with the same n. This will
necessarily reveal lower power since there are fewer budgets. For n = 1;2;3;4;5;9 the Bronars power ￿nds
the fraction of iterations with GARP violations is, respectively, 0.7, 0.60, 0.50, 0.36, 0.30, 0.36. This was
over 10,000 iteration each. To get a perspective on how high these numbers are, note that with two budgets
the maximum value a Bronars index can take is 0.25.
14has the interpretation that a person could have purchased a revealed preferred bundle at a
fraction Ai of what was spent.16 If Ai = 1 there are no violations, and the lower Ai the
worse the violation. The standard proposed by Varian for a signi￿cant violation of GARP is
Ai < 0:95: Of the 30 violations listed in Table 2, 12 are signi￿cant by this de￿nition, which
come from only nine individual subjects. This means 92% of the subjects have choices that
are consistent based on these tests. This is a very high degree of rationalizability.
Table 2
Violations of GARP, holding Number of Others n Constant
Circular Matching Reciprocal Matching
Number Ai Number Ai
with GARP Afriat with GARP Afriat
n Violations E¢ ciency￿ Violations E¢ ciency
1 2 0.73, 0.96 2 0.84, 0.97
2 5 0.97, 0.97, 0.99, 4 0.84, 0.88, 0.95,
0.99, 0.99 0.98
3 1 0.87 4 0.84, 0.96, 0.97,
0.99
4 1 0.95 2 0.83, 0.96
5 3 0.75, 0.95, 0.98 1 0.96





*Bold indicates Ai ￿ 0:95:
16See Afriat (1972) and Varian (1982) for discussions of this index.
155.2 Checking GARP Across Group Sizes
We next turn to evaluating GARP when we pool across group sizes. Whether data is
consistent with GARP will depend on the de￿nition of the giving function g(￿o;n) = nb￿o:
Here we ask, does there exist a b 2 [0;1] for an individual i such that there are no violations
of GARP?
The answer to this question is yes for most subjects. For both the circular and reciprocal
matching, exactly 83 subjects, 69%, have choices that did not violate GARP a single time
for at least one value of b. Those for whom the answer is no are summarized in Tables
3 and 4. Here we report the value of b that resulted in the highest value of the Afriat
index Ai for all the subjects that always violate GARP. Of the 37 subjects with violations,
16 have indices above the Ai ￿ 0:95 threshold, and 20 below. By this measure, 16% of
subjects have severe violations of GARP, and 84% are rationalizable.17 Within the context
of revealed preference experiments, this is a relatively high degree of agreement with the
model, especially for such a large number of budget constraints.18
17We also conducted further tests of di⁄erences between circular and reciprocal matching and again found
no signi￿cant di⁄erences. Comparing the b￿ s reported in Tables 3 and 4 with a Mann-Whitney test, z = 0:127:
Comparing the Ai￿ s reported, z = 0:427: Finally, comparing the number of GARP violations, z = 0:174:
18See Andreoni and Harbaugh (2006) for a discussion of recent experiments using revealed preference tests.
An intresting recent comparison is Fisman, Kariv and Markovits (2006) who provide subjects with 50 choices
of dividing a pie with one other subject. They ￿nd only 10.2% of subjects had no violations of GARP, and
41% were above the Ai ￿ 0:95 threshold.
16Table 3
Values of b, given g(￿o;n) = nb￿o;
that Maximize the Afriat E¢ ciency
for Circular Matching
Ai Afriat Number of
Maximizing E¢ ciency GARP
Subject b Ai Violations
38 0 0.988 1
42 0 0.856 136
58 0 0.994 1
80 0 0.700 15
90 0.075 0.914 24
43 0.175 0.975 3
32 0.250 0.889 119
35 0.275 0.970 16
22 0.300 0.975 16
46 0.325 0.893 20
89 0.400 0.680 92
96 0.400 0.904 28
85 0.425 0.889 36
39 0.625 0.733 115
88 0.775 0.942 28
31 0.900 0.998 1
83 1 0.990 7
98 1 0.556 253
Subjects with Ai = 1 42
Subjects with Ai < 1 : 18
Subjects with Ai < 0:95 : 11
￿Bold indicates Ai ￿ 0:95
17Table 4
Values of b, given g(￿o;n) = nb￿o;
that Maximize the Afriat E¢ ciency
for Reciprocal Matching
Ai Afriat Number of
Maximizing E¢ ciency GARP
Subject b Ai Violations
3 0 0.963 3
5 0 0.833 78
8 0 0.750 120
10 0 0.875 59
12 0 0.833 28
15 0 0.988 1
117 0 0.933 6
102 0.125 0.975 37
6 0.400 0.960 5
112 0.400 0.992 7
62 0.650 0.996 3
108 0.675 0.875 11
119 0.675 0.996 3
101 0.850 0.797 210
75 0.900 0.981 22
106 0.900 0.950 66
73 1 0.783 21
78 1 0.951 45
Subjects with Ai = 1 : 42
Subjects with Ai < 1 : 18
Subjects with Ai < 0:95 : 9
￿Bold indicates Ai ￿ 0:95
This leads to the question, what values of b lead to consistent behavior for those subjects
without violations of GARP? Unfortunately, there is typically no single b that leads to
Ai = 1, but often many b￿ s can be rationalized. To summarize the information across
subjects, we evaluated each subject for violations of GARP for 41 values of b between 0 and
1. If the subject had no violations for a b, we called that b ￿admissible￿for that subject.19
That is, the b could rationalize the data. We then add up how often a value of b was
19This implies, of course, that a subject can have many admissible values of b. A subject who always
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Figure 4: Percent of Subjects for whom b is Admissible, for Subjects with Ai = 1:
admissible across subjects for the pool of subjects for whom at least one b leads to Ai = 1.
This is summarized in Figure 4.
In Figure 4 we see the vast heterogeneity across subjects, but also the weakness of this
semi-parametric approach in identifying the best values of b. There are too many subjects
that have a wide array of admissible values of b. Making a more precise statement about
the distribution of ￿optimal￿b￿ s will require that we turn to parametric analysis.
6 Estimating Utility
This section begins by asking whether the altruism shown here is easily identi￿able as one of
the standard social welfare functions. We then go on to estimate parametric utility functions
for each subject.
19Table 5
Numbers of Subjects as Pure Types
with u(￿i; g(￿o;n)) and g(￿o;n) = nb￿o:
a. Euclidean Distance = 0
b = 0 0 < b < 1 b = 1 Total
Sel￿sh￿ - - - 11
Substitutes 1 2 0 3
Leontief 1 0 0 1
Total 15 (12.5%)
b. Euclidean Distance ￿ 6
Sel￿sh - - - 14
Substitutes 1 2 0 3
Leontief 1 0 0 1
18 (15%)
c. Euclidean Distance ￿ 10
Sel￿sh - - - 16
Substitutes 1 2 0 3
Leontief 1 4 0 5
Total 24 (20%)
￿Any b 2 [0;1] will rationalize sel￿sh choices.
6.1 Identifying the Pure Types
Andreoni and Miller (2002) identi￿ed that a substantial fraction of subjects have preference
that conform to one of three ￿pure types￿when n = 1: These are perfectly sel￿sh, u(￿i;g) =
￿i; utilitarian or perfect substitutes, u(￿i;g) = ￿i + g, and Rawlsian or Leontief, u(￿i;g) =
minf￿i;gg: We ask here if, for each subject, there is some b such that choices match one of
these types.
To answer this, we calculated Euclidean distance, in tokens, to one of the pure choices
for each of 41 b￿ s between 0 and 1. Table 5 shows that 15 subject ￿t one of these exactly,
11 of which were perfectly sel￿sh. Of the three perfect substitutes, one exists for b = 0; and
the other two are for b of 0.65 and 0.68. If we relax our criterion to so that the Euclidean
distance is 6 or less, we include 3 more (nearly) sel￿sh players. If we relax the de￿nition
to a distance of 10, we ￿nd four more Leontief players. These 4 have optimal b￿ s of 0.02,
0.08,0.10, and 0.28. Looking more closely at the data, these are subjects who are best
20described as having Leontief preferences u = minf￿i;￿og (i.e. b = 0), except for one or two
￿mistakes￿that deviate from this.
6.2 Parametric Estimation
Following Andreoni and Miller (2002), we will estimate a CES utility function.20 One
reason for doing this is that the three functions listed above are all CES functions, hence we
can think of all subjects as having preferences from the same family of utility functions. A
second reason is that the CES is reasonably ￿ exible and has very few parameters to estimate.
With 24 observations we found estimation of functions with more parameters, such as the
translog, to be untenable.
Consider the utility function
u(￿i;g) = [a￿
￿
i + (1 ￿ a)g
￿]
1=￿; (2)
where ￿1 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1and ￿ = 1=(￿ ￿ 1) < 0is the elasticity of substitution, and 0 ￿ a ￿ 1.
Assuming g = nb￿o and choosing ￿i as the numeraire, then pg = p=nb. Maximizing (2)








where r = ￿￿=(1 ￿ ￿) and A = [a=(1 ￿ a)]1=(1￿￿):
Because 0 ￿ g￿ ￿ m=pg;we estimate (3) with a two-limit Tobit, censored at both ends of
the budget constraint. The techniques are the same as those used by Andreoni and Miller
(2002), and the same technical appendix applies.
We estimated utility functions for 109 of the subjects, excluding those identi￿ed as per-
fectly sel￿sh in panel a of Table 5. We report the results of all 109 regressions in an appendix
(available from the author). Table 6 gives an overview of the results.
20This has also been done in other papers on revealed preferences and altruism, including Fisman, Kariv,
and Markovots (2006) and Cox, Friedman, and Gjerstad (2007).
21Table 6
Distribution of Utility Parameters for u = [a￿
￿
i + (1 ￿ a)(nb￿o)￿]1=￿,
where ￿ = 1=(￿ ￿ 1) is the elasticity of substitution.
a. b = 0
0 < a < 0:4 0:4 ￿ a < 0:6 0:6 ￿ a < 0:8 0:8 ￿ a < 1 Total
￿0:5 < ￿ 0 0 3 7
￿1:5 ￿ ￿ < ￿0:5 0 0 9 2
￿4 ￿ ￿ < ￿1:5 0 4 1 0
￿ < ￿4 0 1 0 0 27
b. 0 < b < :5
0 < a < 0:4 0:4 ￿ a < 0:6 0:6 ￿ a < 0:8 0:8 ￿ a < 1
￿0:5 < ￿ 4 2 0 2
￿1:5 ￿ ￿ < ￿0:5 2 1 2 1
￿4 ￿ ￿ < ￿1:5 1 6 3 0
￿ < ￿4 1 0 3 5 33
c. 0:5 ￿ b < 1
0 < a < 0:4 0:4 ￿ a < 0:6 0:6 ￿ a < 0:8 0:8 ￿ a < 1
￿0:5 < ￿ 2 1 2 0
￿1:5 ￿ ￿ < ￿0:5 0 2 1 0
￿4 ￿ ￿ < ￿1:5 0 4 4 3
￿ < ￿4 0 2 10 0 31
d. b = 1
0 < a < 0:4 0:4 ￿ a < 0:6 0:6 ￿ a < 0:8 0:8 ￿ a < 1
￿0:5 < ￿ 0 0 0 2
￿1:5 ￿ ￿ < ￿0:5 0 1 4 3
￿4 ￿ ￿ < ￿1:5 0 2 2 0
￿ < ￿4 0 2 1 1 18
Total 10 28 45 26 109
Table 6 divides the estimates based on parameters b, a; and ￿: A ￿ closer to 0 means the
indi⁄erence curves are increasingly L-shaped, they become increasingly ￿ at as ￿ approaches
￿1, and ￿ = ￿1 is Cobb-Douglas utility.
This table reveals a vast heterogeneity across subjects. Of the 109 utility functions
estimated, 25% are best described with b = 0 and fully congested altruism. Another 17%
have b = 1 and purely uncongested altruism. The remaining 58% have preferences best
described as partially congested altruism, 0 < b < 1:
22We can also characterize our sample as favoring themselves more than others. That is,
there are very few subject with a￿ s that favor the other subject. Looking at the individual
regressions, 12 have estimated a < 0:5, and only four of these estimates are signi￿cantly
lower than 0.5.
Finally, subjects also di⁄er greatly on the curvature of their preferences, ranging from
very sharp indi⁄erence curves with ￿0:5 < ￿ (23% of subjects) to very ￿ at indi⁄erence
curves with ￿ < ￿4 (24% of subjects).
On the one hand, the results of this section are gratifying￿ they illustrate what we know
from personal experience, that is, there is vast heterogeneity on altruism. Such di⁄erences
in tastes needs to be kept in mind, for instance, when designing institutions for giving or
calculating the incidence of policy. On the other hand, the heterogeneity makes it di¢ cult to
characterize the central tendency of the society as a whole from individual analysis. To say
something about the ￿average￿person, we must estimate a representative utility function.
7 A Representative Altruist
If we were to characterize the population in aggregate, what b best describes the ￿represen-
tative￿altruist? To answer this we pooled all 120 subjects and each of their 24 decisions into
a single regression to estimate an aggregate CES utility function. The results are reported
in Table 7. All parameters are precisely estimated￿ b, a and ￿ are all signi￿cantly di⁄erent
from both 0 and 1 beyond the ￿ ￿ :001 level. Starting with ￿, we see that the elasticity of
substitution is ￿1:70, indicating indi⁄erence curves that are ￿ atter than Cobb Douglas, but
still quite curved. The parameter a = 0:70 indicates that subjects on average give their own
payo⁄ about twice the weight they give to the aggregate of the others. Finally, b = 0:68
indicates that the representative altruist experiences signi￿cant congestion of altruism.
How do we interpret b = 0:68? Consider Al and his identical twin brother Bob, with
the same income and utility function as estimated above. Al is giving up a dollar, and each
of two others is gaining a dollar. Bob, by contrast, is giving up a dollar and a single other
23person is getting $1.59. Al and Bob have the same utility, that is, 2b = 1:59:
Table 7
Estimates of a CES Utility
u = [a￿
￿
i + (1 ￿ a)(nb￿o)￿]1=￿
For a Representative Altruist.









Here is another way to look at it. Suppose Cindy is spending a dollar which creates one
dollar bene￿t for each of 4 others. The value of this gift is 4b = 2:55: Suppose the bene￿t
expands to one dollar to each of 5 others. This value of this gift is 5b = 2:97. That is,
adding the extra one dollar of social bene￿ts only increased the private value of the gift to the
giver by 0:42: Repeating this exercise moving from 9 to 10, the private bene￿t of the extra
dollar of social bene￿t falls to 0.32. Although it extrapolates well outside of our sample, the
estimated b implies that the 101st dollar of social bene￿t is only worth 0.15 to the giver, and
the 1001st dollar is only worth 0.07 to the giver. For extremely large populations￿ such as
when giving to a pure public good with many consumers￿ people are essentially indi⁄erent
to the number of recipients.
With the utility function estimated above, we can ask how contributions to a public
good change with the size of the group. Figure 5 shows the demand for the average payo⁄s
of others, ￿o; under the assumption that giving is to a pure public good, and under the
assumption that giving is to a pure private good as in the example of pooling of tips described
in sections 1 and 2 above. Since the levels of giving depend on m, we normalized gifts to

























Figure 5: Demand For Average Payo⁄ to Others
Figure 5 shows that for both public and private goods, the demand for average payo⁄s of
others is declining. For public goods, the decline is coming because the substitution e⁄ect
is dominating the income e⁄ect, that is, because one can create the same social value for a
smaller gift people are giving less.21 For private goods this e⁄ect is compounded by the fact
that a higher n raises the price of average payo⁄s.
Perhaps the more important question is what happens to the total social surplus as n
grows. Do gifts fall so much that the surplus is not increased? Figure 6 shows that for
both public and private goods the total social surplus is rising with n. For public goods, we
de￿nitely see the role of congestion of altruism. If altruism were not congested, the slope of
the top line in Figure 6 would be one￿ adding additional consumers would not diminish the
gifts made. Because there is congestion, this slope is less than one.
21The line for public goods in Figure 5 also tells us how a giver￿ s spending on gifts changes with n: While
one needs to add a grain of salt when generalizing outside of the experimental parameters and context, these
preferences would also lead us to say that for large groups, giving to public goods will be largely una⁄ected
by n. When n goes from 100 to 101, for instance, spending on giving falls by only 0.4%, and from 1000 to



































Figure 6: Demand for Total Social Surplus of Others
The line in Figure 6 for private goods also tells an interesting story. Because congestion
is not complete, total giving actually rises here￿ spreading out the food to more food bank
recipients lowers the total utility of the gift. As a result, the marginal utility of a any gift
rises, so giving must increase. By the same token, tip pooling should, all else equal, raise
total tips.
One can also notice that total spending on giving for public goods (the top line in Figure
5) is decreasing for n: This would suggest that if you asked for willingness to give to a
￿national￿ public good, and for a ￿local￿ public good that is nested within the national
good, then giving should be lower at the national level.
8 Conclusion
This paper explores preferences for giving gifts to groups. How does the value of the gift to
the giver depend on the number of recipients? Is altruism in the hearts of givers a congestible
good?
26We address this question by assuming that givers care about an aggregate bene￿t of the
gift, where the aggregator can re￿ ect congestion, that is g = nb￿o and 0 ￿ b ￿ 1: Only if
b = 1 is altruism uncongested.
Using experiments that vary the number of recipients and the price of giving, we found
that 70% of subjects made all 24 choices without a single violation of GARP, and fewer than
17% had violations with Afriat indices below 0.95. We are then able to identify individual
preferences for giving, and to ￿nd the bfor each subject that best ￿ts the choices.
We found that only 17% of our subjects have b = 1 and thus have uncongested altruism.
At the opposite extreme, 25% are fully congested with b = 0: For the remaining 58% we
estimate b￿ s between 0 and 1. The single b that best describes the central tendency in the
data is b = 0:68: That is, as groups grow, altruism of the givers is congested and the value of
the gift to the giver does not grow proportionately with the social value of the public good.
The most direct and immediate consequence of these results is for experiments. In situ-
ations where we think altruism, fairness, and inequality aversion play a role, the preferences
for allocations should depend on the number of people playing the game, even if they are
treated symmetrically.
To the extent we can generalize these ￿ndings outside the lab, they have other interesting
implications. First, as groups grow, average giving will decline. This is not, however, for
the usual strategic reasons of increased free riding, but follows simply from the fact that
congested altruism changes the value of the social surplus to the giver. This means that,
for instance, when presented the option of giving to the economics department or to the
university as a whole, the donor may give more to the economics department. This may be
one reason why university fund-raisers often direct givers to individual departments, research
consortia, or research labs when soliciting major gifts.
Second, when donations buy private goods for a set of people, an individual￿ s total giving
rises slightly with n. This means that waiters who pool tips shouldn￿ t worry about reducing
altruism so much that total tips will fall. A new niece or nephew means that the new child￿ s
27siblings will get smaller birthday presents from their uncle, but the total gifts to the family
will not change much.
Finally, for purposes of tax policy, this suggests that giving to charities that have many
consumers will not be greatly a⁄ected by numbers of givers. The congestion of altruism
means that the marginal utility of giving will decline as the number of consumers increases,
eventually making giving insensitive to n;and tax subsides will not have a di⁄erential inci-
dence across charities of di⁄erent sizes.
This laboratory study is, obviously, only the ￿rst step in understanding how people give
gifts to groups. The most interesting applications of these ￿ndings are to real world giving,
which makes the appeal to external validity all the more important. Future ￿eld studies will
be needed to show whether the results found for the small numbers and special circumstances
of the lab can be extrapolated to the real world.
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